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 Abstract  
Delusion is central to the conceptualisation, definition and identification of schizophrenia. However, 
in current classifications the presence of delusions is neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia, nor is it sufficient to exclude the diagnosis of some other psychiatric 
conditions. Partly as a consequence of these classification rules, it is possible for delusions to exist 
transdiagnostically. In this paper we evaluate the extent to which this happens, and in what ways the 
characteristics of delusions vary according to diagnostic context. We were able to examine their 
presence and form in delusional disorder, affective disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, 
borderline personality disorder and dementia, in all of which they have an appreciable presence. 
There is some evidence that the mechanisms of delusion formation are, at least to an extent, shared 
across these disorders. This transdiagnostic extension of delusions is an argument for targeting them 
therapeutically in their own right. However there is a dearth of research to enable the rational 
transdiagnostic deployment of either pharmacological or psychological treatments.  
 Introduction   
The study of psychiatric symptoms across diagnostic boundaries is complicated by two structural 
constraints. The first is that some symptoms are crucial to the establishment of particular psychiatric 
categories. Thus some of their distribution is curtailed by definition, because of their involvement in 
the identification of disorders. The second constraint is that disorders are arranged hierarchically, 
such that some diagnoses trump others. Thus the spread of delusions is partly definitional and partly 
empirical. Studying their distribution transdiagnostically will therefore reflect both on the real world 
and on the nature of our classifications. In this review we seek to establish and interpret the 
transdiagnostic extension of delusions, symptoms central to the diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Identifying delusions 
To err is human: we all make errors of reasoning and judgement, and, more rarely, errors of sensory 
perception and interpretation. However, some people are identified by consensus as being in 
consistent, persistent and idiosyncratic error, often linked to actions perceived as incomprehensible 
or deeply inappropriate. The recognition that they required assistance rather than exorcism or 
punishment meant that the lay concept of madness gradually became the province of physicians. 
Specific aspects of madness were consequently codified as delusions and hallucinations. In this 
paper we will interpret the distribution of delusions in a whole range of people with psychiatric 
disorders. 
The identification of psychiatric symptoms generally involves the ascription of a cut-off point to what 
is essentially a set of continua. Symptoms vary in intensity, persistence and the level of associated 
distress. Thus identifying the symptom of depressed mood, for example, requires a judgement that 
the lowering of mood is sufficiently severe, sufficiently persistent, and sufficiently consistent to 
qualify. Such sufficiency is hard to define, and precise definition is in any case rarely attempted (but 
see WHO 19941). Equivalent judgements must be made about the symptom of anxiety. Delusions too 
have dimensional attributes, and grandiose and persecutory delusions in particular shade into 
ordinary beliefs.  
While most psychiatric professionals have confidence in their ability to recognise delusions, they find 
it very difficult indeed to offer a definition that is conceptually watertight, and immune to counter-
example. Indeed we would go so far as to assert that there is no criterion or set of criteria that is 
sufficient and necessary in the separation of delusions from normal beliefs. Stephens and Graham2 
describe four criteria that serve to define beliefs in general. They characterise them as: (1) beliefs 
have a content, that is, they contain statements as to putative facts; (2) the idea of a belief implies 
confidence (a degree of conviction) about its truth; (3) beliefs form the basis for both reasoning and 
action; and finally (4) they are associated with an emotional response.  
These authors assert that identification of these features cannot guarantee to distinguish delusions 
from normal beliefs. For instance, we have operations for evaluating the truth standing of beliefs. No 
such operations are watertight, though some are better than others. Those used in the procedures 
of science and the law have formal rigour which gives them an edge, but in other circumstances we 
have only consensus to fall back on. Delusions are defined as false representations of reality. If we 
cannot guarantee their falsehood we may still provisionally accept them as delusional, but if they are 
true beliefs we should not accept them as delusions but merely as vehement ideas. 
Psychiatric symptoms and psychiatric classification 
Central to the practice of medicine and hence of psychiatry is the refinement of the phenomena of ill 
health into agreed constructs representing symptoms and disorders. The relationship between these 
two types of construct is both conceptual and technical.  
The concept of disorder developed hand-in-hand with the observation that individual manifestations 
of ill health present with distinguishable features. These features were formalised under the rubric 
of symptoms. The fact that symptoms tended to form natural clusters led to the formulation of 
syndromes (from the Greek for “running together”), enabling ill-health to be divided into different 
types (think Aretaeus and the conceptualisation of diabetes mellitus3).  The construction of 
syndromes requires a leap of the imagination, but if they appear plausible summaries of reality they 
become accepted as consistent phenomena, and hence a suitable basis for medical investigation. 
They may also come to be seen as real in an objective sense4,5 (though not by us6). 
Classification based on syndromes is the defining feature of the medical approach to issues of 
health. It is based on the presumption that it will ultimately enable the rational allotment of 
treatments and other interventions. In particular the categories are accepted on the provisional 
basis that they capture intrinsic mechanisms and processes (reflected as aetiology and pathology) 
that should provide targets for specific interventions.  This is certainly a logical way of arriving at 
possible treatments. Such treatments may or may not work: if they do not, they call in question the 
hypothesised mechanisms.  
Defining disorders 
An ideal medical classification incorporates classes distinguishable both from each other and from a 
state of good health. It thus has internal boundaries and a threshold, both of which may be hard to 
define. This medical approach is characteristic of psychiatry, and, at least insofar as it relies on 
diagnostic groupings, has been used in clinical psychology. 
Symptoms of physical disorders (for example, chest pain) comprise subjective experiences that map 
onto physical processes. They are valuable because they suggest investigations that identify the 
physical basis of disorder. Psychological symptoms by analogy are held to indicate psychological 
disorders such as anxiety or schizophrenia. However, though there may be underlying physical 
processes, these have not been established to a degree that enables them to be used diagnostically. 
In consequence, we only have the symptoms to go on.  
 Psychiatric symptoms do form natural clusters, albeit rather fuzzy ones. However, they are also 
widely distributed in the general population. Many people have a few symptoms, a few people have 
many.  This is most clearly the case for affective symptoms, but is also seen in relation to psychotic 
symptoms7-14. Indeed the shape of the distribution curves of affective and psychotic phenomena is 
remarkably similar11,16. Thus the differentiation of psychiatric disorders requires the imposition of 
categories on continuous distributions17,18.  
This has consequences, both for comorbidity and for the existence within disorder-categories of 
symptoms that do not contribute to the diagnostic process. Symptoms tend to display a hierarchical 
arrangement. Usually the most disabling symptoms are the least frequent. This drives an empirical 
non-reflexive relationship: more severe, rarer symptoms are more predictive of common minor 
symptoms than the reverse11. To an extent, this hierarchy is reflected in the way psychiatric 
disorders are constructed. Thus schizophrenia is high in the hierarchy, with delusional disorder 
below it. 
The identification of symptoms acknowledged by consensus as key to a particular disorder forms the 
basis of diagnosis. However, to a variable extent, each diagnostic category will also reflect the 
population distribution of other symptoms. Thus, within a given category, key symptoms will be 
present by definition, but there may also be a variable selection of non-specific, ancillary 
symptoms19. This is seen in the widespread coexistence of affective symptoms in schizophrenia20. 
However, some symptoms ancillary to a given disorder may turn out to have a more than incidental 
role in its development. We would argue that this is the case with schizophrenia.  
Diagnosis rarely requires the presence of all potentially defining symptoms. Thus in DSM5 the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia requires two of the five characteristic symptoms to be present for a 
month, of which one must be delusions, hallucinations or disorganised speech. This clearly implies 
that, even in terms only of these key symptoms, cases of schizophrenia will in practice have different 
symptom profiles (the five domains of diagnostic symptoms in schizophrenia are, in different 
combinations, capable of generating 22 distinct profiles based on two or more of the domains). 
Moreover, if only one of these characteristic symptoms is present, for example delusions, a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia will not be made. In this circumstance, the symptom profile may meet criteria for 
delusional disorder, or for a disorder outside the schizophrenia spectrum in which the delusions 
become ancillary.  
Syndromes and disease entities 
The definition of a syndrome implies (but does not guarantee) that the syndrome captures an 
underlying disease entity. This then comes to be seen as the cause of the symptoms that 
characterise the syndrome. In this formulation, the symptoms are taken to reflect the disorder, 
rather than constituting it21.  Something similar happens when, rather than being a theoretical 
construct, the underlying entity is inferred statistically, in the form of a latent variable22. Covariation 
between symptoms is then interpreted as the effect of their common origin. Moreover, causal 
influences external to the disorder are taken to operate on symptoms because of their effect on the 
disorder. Thus in this model the external cause is seen as conditionally independent of the 
symptoms. The transdiagnostic study of symptoms is then key to the investigation of overlap 
between hypothesised disease entities. 
However, major problems remain in establishing the biological basis of schizophrenia. The 
endophenotype project is in trouble23, and there are serious problems with the genetics of 
schizophrenia: the discovery of hundreds of common gene variants minimally associated with 
schizophrenia in GWAS studies24-26 means that individual disease risk scores may bear little relation 
to one another and makes it difficult to accept that a genetic basis underpins mechanisms in any 
easily determined manner. Indeed, Cohen27 has suggested more individual genotypic patterns could 
be associated with schizophrenia than there are people with schizophrenia on the planet. Finally, 
delusions appear to be the psychotic symptom least associated with familial-genetic factors28. 
However, there is an alternative interpretation, which has had increasing support29. Thus it is equally 
conceivable that symptoms might co-vary because of direct causal interaction between them; 
external causes could then operate directly on individual symptoms21,30,31. If so, it becomes rational 
to study symptoms transdiagnostically, on the ground that their causes may themselves operate 
across diagnostic classes. Moreover, if symptoms are linked in a causal chain, interventions targeting 
a given symptom may ameliorate symptoms downstream of it32,33. 
 The effect of definition on the phenomenology of psychiatric categories  
The transdiagnostic identification of delusions is complicated by issues arising from the definition of 
disorders. Thus the presence or absence of delusions in given psychiatric categories is sometimes the 
direct consequence of the way the disorders are defined. This may therefore change as the 
definition is revised, as for example in the case of bizarre delusions and delusional disorder. The 
recent decision in DSM5 that bizarre delusions are allowable symptoms in delusional disorder means 
that, where previously they were excluded by definition, they are now likely to be present in some 
cases. Likewise the new DSM5 category of Obsessive-Compulsive and Related Disorders includes a 
specifier related to delusional insight. Consequently, delusional disorder has an exclusion criterion 
specifying that symptoms cannot be better explained by OCD or similar disorder with 
absent/delusional insight. Thus delusional beliefs no longer automatically suggest a psychotic 
disorder in DSM5. 
Finally, two of the 14 specifiers of Major Depressive Disorder are “with mood-congruent psychotic 
features” and “with mood-incongruent psychotic features”. This implies that the presence of 
delusions is not excluded within the definition, and indeed that they may count toward the diagnosis 
even if they are mood-incongruent. In consequence, a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder will be 
avoided where previously it would have beenaccepted.  
Classification and comorbidity 
In some situations the pattern of symptoms is such that the criteria for more than one disorder are 
met34,35. The implications of such comorbidity are unclear. On the face of it, if two disorders are 
identified, it might be inferred that the aetiological processes characteristic of each disorder are 
separately involved.  This seems somewhat unlikely. As Goldberg18 points out, a good classification 
should have points of rarity between classes. Only then will comorbidity in the individual case be 
truly informative, rather than the artefact of a spurious separation. However, in psychiatry points of 
rarity rarely exist: hence the boundary problem. Disorders are recognised by core (defining) features, 
but ancillary symptoms are so common as to be the rule. In some cases these may be used as an 
exclusion clause in the definition of the disorder, in other cases they are discounted as incidental. 
However, symptoms ancillary to one disorder may be defining to another, thus forming the basis of 
what Goldberg17 would argue is a non-informative comorbidity. The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that the association between symptoms that underlie comorbidity may change as time 
passes36. 
Systematic review 
We attempted a systematic review on Medline of research comparing the form and content of 
delusions in different diagnostic categories. Our search was based on the following terms (delus*) 
AND (Compar* OR Differen* OR Similarit* OR Contrast*). We included empirical papers contrasting 
directly two or more groups with delusions, where one of these groups included people with 
schizophrenia. It turns out that there have been very few comparisons of the features characteristic 
of delusions in different psychiatric conditions. We identified 782 articles, and discarded 720 on the 
basis of their abstracts. Of the 62 papers remaining, we read and rejected 46, leaving 16 that met 
our criteria. However, these articles were of such variable methodology and quality that we merely 
refer to some of them in the following narrative review. For the purposes of illustration, we have 
focussed specifically on delusions in affective disorders, delusional disorder, borderline personality 
disorder, obsessional disorders and dementia. 
Delusions in affective disorders 
A majority of delusions have persecutory themes irrespective of nosological context. However, a 
substantial minority are characterised by content that seems to reflect the mood disturbance. They are 
then described as mood-congruent, although it is not always easy to distinguish reliably between 
mood-congruence and mood-incongruence37. As this distinction feeds into the diagnostic separation 
of schizophrenic and affective disorders, their transdiagnostic prevalence is partly definitional.  
Somewhat surprisingly there has been little attempt to establish the actual frequency of delusions in 
affective disorders. Delusions, both mood congruent and incongruent, may occur in around 20% of 
patients with major depression38, although this will vary with severity and depend on the way the 
samples are drawn. Delusions are more common in bipolar disorder: Azorin and colleagues39 reported 
on a study of over a thousand patients with manic episodes. Half had psychotic symptoms, of which 
one-third were mood-incongruent. Mood-incongruence was more often associated with having had 
earlier diagnoses of schizophrenia and, more surprisingly, of anxiety disorders. It was also  more 
frequent where mood was particularly unstable. Bipolar disorder is specifically associated with 
grandiose delusions, although delusions with persecutory content are common. However, grandiose 
delusions are also common in other disorders – in half of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia, and 
a sizeable proportion of patients with substance abuse disorders40.  
Delusions in delusional disorder 
Delusional disorder is an inconsistent category41, the consequence of its inferior position to 
schizophrenia in the diagnostic hierarchy. Thus Heslin et al.42 found only 19% of cases retained the 
diagnosis at 10 year follow-up, whereas 57% had acquired a diagnosis of schizophrenia. This is 
relevant to the interpretation of comparisons of delusional disorder and schizophrenia.  
There have been a number of such comparisons, but as both disorders have the presence of 
delusions as an identifying characteristic, they rarely involve the specific attributes of delusions.  One 
exception is the study by Peralta and Cuesta43,44.  Although there was a considerable overlap, they 
found that people with delusional disorder had higher levels of conviction and preoccupation, while 
themes of persecution were more salient than in schizophrenia. They had higher levels of anxiety, 
dysphoria and depression than people with schizophrenia, and also had more obsessional 
symptoms. Their delusions affected more areas of their lives. Conversely, people with schizophrenia 
were more likely to have bizarre and internally inconsistent delusions.  
Hui et al.45 compared patients in first episodes of delusional disorder or schizophrenia. While the 
former had less in the way of premorbid schizoid and schizotypal traits, there were few substantive 
differences in symptom severity or neurocognitive performance. Note that this study has been 
criticised methodologically 46. 
Delusions in borderline personality disorder (BPD) 
Borderline personality disorder is identified primarily through the confluence of longstanding traits 
and impairments, rather than the emergence of specific symptoms. However, its diagnostic standing 
has been in flux, exemplified by the merging of axes I and II in DSM5. Psychotic experiences might be 
expected in BPD because the diagnostic criteria include features that encourage their emergence. 
Thus people with BPD show pathological personality traits in the domains of emotional lability, 
anxiety, depressed mood and interpersonal hypersensitivity (hence the suggestions it should be 
renamed mood dysregulation disorder 47).  
Nevertheless there has long been a tendency to discount psychotic symptoms in BPD in a way that 
allowed a clear but, we would argue, spurious separation between BPD and psychotic disorders 48,49. 
Thus Links et al.50 set out what they regarded as the possible interpretations of the association of 
psychotic symptoms with BPD. They argued that broadly defined psychotic symptoms were common 
in BPD, but defined narrowly they were rare. Moreover, when narrowly defined symptoms occurred, 
they were due to concomitant (psychotic) disorders, or were factitious. They claimed their study of 
88 patients with BPD confirmed these tendentious suppositions. 
Oliva et al.51 contrasted people with BPD and with schizophrenia. Members of each group 
experienced two types of psychotic experience: a transient, circumscribed and atypical form, and a 
prolonged, widespread and bizarre psychotic form. Each type of experience was very frequent, but 
the former were more common in BPD, and the latter in schizophrenia.  Non-delusional paranoia 
was common to both groups, though more severe in BPD. Pearse et al.52 found a lower prevalence of 
actual delusions in BPD, though it was still marked (20%).  
Kingdon et al.53 compared patients with schizophrenia, BPD, and both diagnoses. Nearly two-thirds 
of those with a diagnosis of schizophrenia (whether comorbid with BPD or not) were identified as 
having paranoid delusions, compared with a third of those diagnosed as having BPD alone.  
Psychotic features in obsessional disorders 
Bleuler54 recognised that obsessive compulsive symptoms occur in schizophrenia. Fenton and 
McGlashan55 reported clinically significant obsessional symptoms in 13% of 163 hospitalized 
schizophrenia patients, a rate well above chance. It is thus also conceivable that in situations where 
the diagnostic criteria for obsessive compulsive disorder are met, there may be ancillary psychotic 
symptoms. Eisen & Rasmussen56 found that 14% of 475 patients with diagnosed OCD had psychotic 
symptoms, although in a substantial minority this was restricted to lack of insight and high 
conviction about the reasonableness of their obsessions. Guillem et al57 provide evidence suggesting 
this association came partly from a more specific relationship between delusions and obsessions (as 
opposed to compulsions), and that this reflected a similarity of mechanism. Obsessions are intrusive 
and distressing thoughts, images, or impulses, and have been analysed in detail as a form of 
metacognitive belief.  
Like anxiety, obsessional beliefs may have a role in the development and exacerbation of psychotic 
episodes. However, while anxiety disorders are characterised by an increase in the threat attention 
and startle responses, OCD demonstrates thought-action fusion, the belief that thinking about 
something makes it more likely 58.  
Obsessional beliefs and anxiety both appear more prominent in the acute rather than the stabilized 
phase of psychosis59. This tallies with the finding of Fear et al.60 that where obsessions co-existed 
with delusions, they generally preceded them. Thus they seem to march pari passu with the 
development of psychotic symptoms.  
Delusions in people with dementia 
Dementia provides a particularly interesting context in which to study delusions, given that it is a 
disorder with a clear biological substrate. While the underlying causal mechanisms may differ from 
those in conditions where the nature of biological abnormalities is less secure and less compellingly 
correlated with delusional processes, the psychological mechanisms may be similar.  
Psychotic symptoms are certainly a frequent feature of dementia 61-63. In their meta-analysis, Zhao et 
al.62 calculated that nearly a third of cases of Alzheimer’s disease had delusions, and 16% had 
hallucinations, though these values disguise appreciable heterogeneity between studies.  Overall, 
delusions seem to be more common than hallucinations in dementia. Some have warned against a 
‘global’ approach to psychotic symptoms in these conditions, as delusions and hallucinations appear 
to have discrete clinical and neurobiological correlates. A recent systematic review of psychotic 
symptoms in dementia identified 23 cohort studies63. As might be expected, the prevalence of 
delusions varied in response to methods of selection and assessment: the cumulative prevalence 
during follow-up ranged from 34% to 80%. While delusional ideation fluctuated, it tended to 
increase with time.  
As in other disorders, the predominant content of delusions in dementia is persecutory60,61. However 
another very common delusional type involves misidentification: one’s home is not one’s home; a 
family member is a duplicate or an imposter; images on the television are actually people present in 
the house64. Misidentification beliefs were initially described as perceptual abnormalities65, but are 
now generally classified as delusions. It has nevertheless been argued that paranoid and 
misidentification symptoms represent two distinct subtypes, characterised by different pathological 
and cognitive trajectories66,67. Overall, delusions in AD are associated with increased age, and with 
the rate and severity of cognitive decline68-70. However, persecutory delusions tend to emerge earlier 
in the illness, while misidentification delusions are typical of increased cognitive impairment and 
advanced dementia63, and also have more significant genetic correlates.  
Delusions in AD were initially interpreted as a logical attempt by people with cognitive deficits to 
understand their environment71. However, they soon came to be regarded as having neurobiological 
underpinnings72, with the accelerated deterioration in people with delusions being taken to indicate 
a biological basis shared between delusional and cognitive symptoms.  
Interestingly, the combination of AD and psychotic features is familial, suggesting that it is 
biologically distinct from non-psychotic AD73 (and possibly also from psychosis in the absence of 
dementia28). This is supported by the fact that the presence of psychotic symptoms in AD is 
associated with a relatively greater increase in impairment across neocortical regions72. There is also 
a suggestion that delusions in dementia are particularly associated with right-sided brain 
dysfunction74. However, given the fluctuation in psychotic symptoms in dementia, it seems likely 
that the association is with a propensity to such symptoms, rather than with the symptoms 
themselves. Although psychotic features in Alzheimer’s disease have a familial basis, it is not 
associated with the apolipoprotein E gene75,76. The mechanisms behind the genetic contribution to 
psychotic symptoms in AD are unknown, but there is more evidence to support the involvement of 
putative risk genes for schizophrenia than those directly linked to late-onset AD. Functional imaging 
studies in AD may overlap with those from young adults with schizophrenia, as they have implicated 
regions and functional networks thought to be involved in salience attribution, belief evaluation and 
mentalising. 
Transdiagnostic mechanisms of delusion formation 
The clinical and scientific investigation of delusions should involve clarification of mechanisms. The 
delusional type central to schizophrenia concerns persecutory ideation. More than 70% of patients 
presenting with a first episode of psychosis have a persecutory delusion77.This is also the type for 
which psychological treatments are best established. Thus the factors maintaining persecutory 
delusions are plausible targets of treatment. 
Because delusions are transdiagnostic there is an argument for studying and treating them in their 
own right. The psychological mechanisms of delusion formation appear quite consistent across 
diagnoses. McLean et al 78 report a meta-analysis of cognitive biases in psychosis: jumping to 
conclusions (JTC - using less information to make quick judgements), biases against disconfirmatory 
and confirmatory evidence, and liberal acceptance (over-rating the plausibility of absurd 
interpretations). These biases were marked in people with schizophrenia if they currently had 
delusions; those without current delusions did not differ from healthy controls. JTC was also seen in 
groups experiencing delusions in the context of other psychiatric disorders, but not in non-delusional 
psychiatric conditions, with the possible exception of obsessional disorder79. The jumping to 
conclusions bias was of similar frequency and extent in people with schizophrenia and psychotic 
depression80. Overall, these results indicate that while the biases co-vary with delusional severity, 
they are associated with delusions transdiagnostically, implying that they have an intrinsic role in the 
process of delusion-formation. 
A range of other internal factors are also important in persecutory delusions, which appear to be 
driven and maintained by worry, mood disturbance and instability, disrupted sleep, anomalous 
experiences, reasoning biases, safety behaviours, negative self-beliefs, and a propensity towards an 
exaggerated experience of stimulus salience (aberrant salience)32,80-87. In patients with schizophrenia, 
patients with depression, and non-morbid controls, paranoia appears strongly associated with 
negative self-esteem and pessimistic expectations80.  
Dementia is an interesting case in relation to transdiagnostic mechanisms. Although it has an 
established neuropathology, this may not be the direct cause of delusion formation. The impairment 
of cognition is likely to lead to inconsistent misinterpretations of the social and physical 
environment, and this in turn will provoke anxious responses. Symptoms characteristic of affective 
disturbance (depression, anxiety, irritability and sleep disorder) all appear to be present in around 
40% of cases of dementia62. Thus the psychotic symptoms may plausibly have drivers similar to those 
in psychotic disorders unassociated with dementia. However, there have been no studies of 
psychological mechanisms in the development of delusions in these conditions.  
The internal factors linked to delusion formation correspond to external experiences. Disorders 
associated with delusional symptoms consistently occur in the context of a history of trauma: 
bullying, physical abuse and sexual abuse80, 88-90. Kingdon et al.89 found very high levels of trauma in 
patients with schizophrenia and borderline personality disorder. Almost all those with BPD alone 
(92%) or with both diagnoses (82%) reported moderate or severe emotional abuse, while nearly as 
many had similar levels of emotional neglect. Two-thirds of the BPD group and 44% of the comorbid 
group reported severe sexual abuse. Conversely, approximately half (52%) of the BPD-alone group 
and 67% of the comorbid group reported moderate-to-severe physical abuse. While the levels of 
trauma were significantly lower in the schizophrenia-only group, they were still way above those 
found in the general population88; more than half (54%) reported being severely or moderately 
emotionally abused in childhood, 31% physically abused, and 20% severely sexually abused. Thus 
differences in abuse history between schizophrenia and BPD were quantitative, not qualitative. The 
social aetiology of delusions in psychosis is consistent with the finding that positive symptoms of 
psychosis may be the attributes least driven by familial-genetic factors24. 
 
Alternative approaches 
We live in interesting times. In the past 15 years there has been a major advance in understanding the 
social and psychological causes of persecutory ideation. This has shaped the development of much 
more efficacious treatments for persecutory delusions occurring in schizophrenia and related 
diagnoses. The identification of mechanisms maintaining persecutory delusions has encouraged the 
development of specific treatments aimed at the reduction of worry91`, enhancement of self-
confidence92, improving sleep93, the modification of maladaptive thinking styles94,95, and the avoidance 
of safety behaviours96. 
We know virtually nothing about how pharmaceutical treatments effect improvements in individual 
symptoms of psychosis, and hence we cannot at present use pharmacological treatments rationally 
in combination with psychological treatments. We need to know more. It is assumed that 
pharmacological agents treat the supposed underlying disorder directly and it is this that leads to 
symptomatic improvement; the effects may be sequential in a way that lends itself to synergy. How 
do pharmacological treatments affect maintenance factors? There is very little information about 
this. However, So and her colleagues97 reviewed the way reasoning biases in people with 
schizophrenia respond to pharmacological treatment. The 17 available studies were small, and often 
uncontrolled. Few were longitudinal and the measures used were variable. Nevertheless JTC and 
reduced belief flexibility (sticking rigidly to conclusions) appear closely related to the severity of 
delusions, while externalising attributional style (avoiding self-blame) is related to overall 
psychopathology, and impaired theory of mind (a reduced understanding of why others behave as 
they do) to negative symptoms. Antipsychotic treatment leads to an improvement in belief flexibility 
and theory of mind. It is possible belief flexibility might be mediating the antipsychotic treatment 
response. On the other hand, the jumping to conclusions bias was unchanged by pharmacological 
treatment and may specifically require psychological treatment. Clearly, further longitudinal studies 
of the course of improvement in response to drug treatment would be valuable.  
Conclusions 
The ultimate purpose of conceptualising and diagnosing medical conditions is to narrow treatment 
choices in a productive and helpful way.  Our disease constructs are therefore to be judged by how 
easy it is to distinguish them and how specific and effective our treatments are. Studying the 
distribution of psychiatric symptoms demonstrates the idiosyncrasies and imperfections of our 
classifications, and hence a useful corrective for intellectual and therapeutic complacency.  
The concept of schizophrenia clearly retains significant functions. It is the major grounds for deciding 
to use antipsychotic medication, and this will not change despite recent reservations about the 
circumstances in which it is helpful98. It is also the basis for identifying samples for research, 
including psychological research. Nonetheless, it is clear that there are problems. The existence of 
key symptoms of schizophrenia in other disorders raises questions about the validity of the 
schizophrenia concept, but also about how to deal with transdiagnostic symptoms. There is an 
argument for offering to treat them wherever they cause problems, irrespective of diagnosis, but the 
effectiveness of treatments is less secure outside the the originally targetted disorders.  
There are therefore strong arguments for research into transdiagnostic symptoms, to study their 
form, their underlyng mechanisms, and their response to pharmacological and psychological 
treatment. This would allow the development of treatment protocols. We know little enough about 
the time course of response to neuroleptic medication in schizophrenia, but it would be worth knowing 
how this differs in other conditions.  It would also be interesting to see if the same social and 
psychological influences shape delusions in conditions other than schizophrenia, as current psychological 
treatments might be relatively easily transferrable.  
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